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Network robustness against attacks is one of the most fundamental researches in network science
as it is closely associated with the reliability and functionality of various networking paradigms.
However, despite the study on intrinsic topological vulnerabilities to node removals, little is known
on the network robustness when network defense mechanisms are implemented, especially for net-
worked engineering systems equipped with detection capabilities. In this paper, a sequential defense
mechanism is firstly proposed in complex networks for attack inference and vulnerability assessment,
where the data fusion center sequentially infers the presence of an attack based on the binary attack
status reported from the nodes in the network. The network robustness is evaluated in terms of
the ability to identify the attack prior to network disruption under two major attack schemes, i.e.,
random and intentional attacks. We provide a parametric plug-in model for performance evalua-
tion on the proposed mechanism and validate its effectiveness and reliability via canonical complex
network models and real-world large-scale network topology. The results show that the sequential
defense mechanism greatly improves the network robustness and mitigates the possibility of net-
work disruption by acquiring limited attack status information from a small subset of nodes in the
network.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, with the advance of computation
technology and the accessibility of real-world large-scale
network data, the exploration and analysis of large-scale
network attributes have received tremendous attention
in network science [1] as they disclosed the mysterious
masks in nature as well as man-made engineered sys-
tems and contrive to answer the fundamental network-
ing problems such as network formulation, dependency,
resilience and evolution. Such networks, consisting of
numerous nodes and intricate interconnections embed-
ded with heterogeneous network structures in the graph-
theoretic point of view, are renowned as complex net-
works [2–4]. Owing to large-scale network size, extreme
volume of empirical network data, and potentially biased
network sampling techniques [5], explicit analysis on the
network structure turns out to be computationally infea-
sible and theoretically intractable. Consequently, collec-
tive network attributes instead of exact network topology
are preferable for complex network analysis, and the de-
veloped measurement metrics (e.g., clustering coefficient
and network centrality) play an essential role in network
science and they have been applied to aid the design of
communication systems [6]. Among all the network at-
tributes, the degree distribution of the entire network
is one of the most salient feature that specifies the link
characteristics since the degree distribution is defined as
the probability distribution of the number of links of an
arbitrarily selected node in the complex network, and it
can be specified by a few network parameters.
What is of our particular interest in network science
is the study of network resilience [7] (i.e., the extent of
network tolerance to node removals) because of its kin
relation and assessment to network robustness and con-
nectivity in many networked engineering systems [8–12].
Typical examples include but are not limited to denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks and jamming attacks. In particu-
lar, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has identified
attack resistance to be one of the seven major proper-
ties required for the operation of smart grid [13]. From
the bird’s-eye view of the entire network, the giant con-
nected component vanishes and the entire network is dis-
integrated into several small components when the frac-
tion of the removed nodes exceeds certain critical value,
which is known as the critical phenomenon of percola-
tion theory in statistic physics [14]. More importantly,
this critical phenomenon can be well mapped to the net-
work robustness and connectivity of many practical net-
worked engineering systems, owing to the network re-
silience protocols that the network retains its operations
as long as a majority of nodes remain its functionality
(i.e., most of the nodes are still connected). Throughout
this paper, the critical phenomenon for network disrup-
tion caused by node removals are used to evaluate the
performance of the proposed network defense mechanism
and we denote the critical value for network disruption
as the percolation-based connectivity.
Our physical model is built upon the structure of many
practical networked engineering systems where a data fu-
sion is responsible for data inference and decision mak-
ing as illustrated in Fig. 1. Although a vast amount
of research has been done in analyzing intrinsic network
resilience in complex networks and devising efficient in-
trusion/anomaly detection techniques in practical net-
worked engineering systems separately, a complete and
interdisciplinary network robustness analysis including
both the intrinsic network resilience as well as the em-
bedded attack detection capability is still poorly under-
stood. In this paper, a sequential defense mechanism
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FIG. 1. Structure of practical engineering system. A data
fusion center is responsible for data inference and decision
making based on the feedback data from the network. The
solid lines represent localized connections (e.g., physical links
in a power grid) and the dashed lines represent delocalized
connections (e.g., friends in a social network) in the com-
plex network. (a) Traditional data fusion scheme. Each node
feedbacks its observation on a common event (e.g., channel
vacancy or temperature) to the data fusion center for hy-
pothesis test. (b) Intelligent targeted attack. Red solid ar-
rows point to the targeted nodes. An intelligent adversary
leverages the network topology to target the most vulnerable
nodes to disrupt the entire network. As this targeted attack
is not a common event to all the nodes, most of the nodes
are unaware of the attack and therefore it is more difficult to
be detected. Consequently, intelligent targeted attack hinders
the attack inference precision and poses severe threats on the
network robustness.
is first proposed in complex networks where each node
performs individual attack detection and sequentially re-
ports binary attack status (i.e., under attack or not) to
the data fusion center as shown in Fig. 1. The data
fusion center then sequentially infers the presence of net-
work attacks based on the feedback and makes a final
decision when sufficient information has been collected.
This mechanism is particularly applicable to networking
paradigms with enormous number of nodes and stringent
data transmission resources. It is also worth mentioning
that the proposed sequential defense mechanism is quite
distinct from the traditional data fusion scheme [15] due
to the fact that the network attack may not be a com-
mon event to all the nodes in the network as illustrated
in Fig. 1. In other words, an intelligent adversary can
target at some crucial nodes instead of launching attacks
on the entire network to efficiently disrupt the network
and reduce the risks of being detected, which therefore
hinders the attack inference precision and poses severe
threats on the network robustness.
The performance of the proposed sequential defense
mechanism is evaluated under random and intentional
attacks, as random attack plays an identical role of tem-
poral node disfunction and intentional attack refers to
malicious attack caused by an adversary. We provide
a parametric plug-in model for performance evaluation
on the sequential defense mechanism, and we implement
our mechanism in both canonical complex network mod-
els and empirical network data to validate its reliabil-
ity and effectiveness. In addition to analyzing the crit-
ical value to sustain percolation-based connectivity via
statistic physics approaches [14], we would like to point
out that our defense mechanism is a general framework
which does not depend on any underlaying complex net-
work models but is applicable to any network with arbi-
trary network structures, provided that the critical value
of the network can be realized at hand. The results show
that our defense mechanism greatly enhances the network
robustness and provides reliable protection against fatal
attacks, even in the complex networks with fragile net-
work structure and weak detection capability, which also
offer new insights toward network robustness enhance-
ment and robust network design.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The
related works are summarized in Sec. II. Preliminaries
on the percolation-based connectivity and the canonical
complex network models are introduced in Sec. III. The
system model and sequential defense mechanism are elu-
cidated in Sec. IV. The critical values under random and
intentional attacks are analyzed in Sec. V. The anal-
ysis on the sequential defense mechanism is derived in
Sec. VI. The performance evaluation of the proposed
defense mechanism in canonical complex network mod-
els and empirical network data are shown in Sec. VII.
Sec. VIII provides discussions for robust network design.
Finally, Sec. IX concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
The intrinsic topological vulnerabilities regarding dif-
ferent network structures under random and intentional
attacks were first introduced in [7]. Compared with ran-
dom attack, intentional attack is shown to be quite ef-
fective in disintegrating the entire network by removing
a relatively small fraction of nodes with the highest de-
gree in the network. As many real-world networks are
observed to possess a heavy-tailed degree distribution,
such as the webpage links in World Wide Web (WWW)
[16], router maps in Internet [17] and contacts in email
networks [18], the existence of nodes with a relatively
large number of links render such networks particularly
vulnerable to intentional attack. Moreover, it has been
demonstrated in [19] that intentional attack is the most
effective attack strategy to disrupt the entire network
when the network topology is known by the adversary,
which suggests intentional attack to be an ever-increasing
threat on the network robustness of many networked en-
gineering systems.
With the aid of statistic physics and percolation the-
ory [14], the critical values (i.e., the fraction of removed
nodes) for a complex network to sustain random and in-
tentional attacks prior to network disruption are investi-
gated in [20] and [21], respectively, which offer analyti-
cally tractable tools for network robustness assessment.
Please note that most of the existing research on network
robustness against attacks mainly focus on intrinsic topo-
logical vulnerabilities while the impacts of implementing
network defense mechanisms on the network robustness
are still poorly understood. A naive perfect node pro-
tection scheme is proposed in [22] to prevent a subset of
nodes in the network from being attacked, which can be
shown as a degenerate case of our proposed model. A
two-player, zero-sum attack and defense game is intro-
duce in [10, 23, 24] to alleviate the damage caused by
intentional attack by acquiring attack status from each
node for attack inference and defense reaction, and the
outcome of the game equilibrium is used to evaluate the
network robustness. However, this mechanism is not suit-
able in networked systems with an enormous number of
nodes and stringent data transmission resources as fre-
quent data transmissions may deteriorate the system per-
formance and inevitably incur excessive energy consump-
tion.
To provide efficient defense for complex networks, a
sequential hypothesis test approach [25] is proposed to
identify the attack while acquiring as little information
from the network as possible. The data fusion center
acquires the reports from each node in descending degree
order, and therefore it is able to spare the transmissions
of the unreported nodes once the process of sequential
test terminates, which balances the goals of promptness
and accuracy for attack inference.
III. PRELIMINARIES ON COMPLEX
NETWORKS
A. Percolation-based Connectivity in Complex
Networks
In the realms of network science, the degree (the num-
ber of links of a node) distribution plays an essential role
in characterizing the collective topological features. With
the advance of computation capability and the accessi-
bility of large-scale network data, the long-believed to-
tally random link connections [26] have been overthrown
by the extraordinary and ubiquitous degree distributions
found in a variety of research areas, such as the power-
law distribution in the Internet router-level topological
maps [17] and the small world phenomenon in social net-
works [27]. We denote the degree distribution of a com-
plex network by P (k), where k ∈ [kmin, kmax] and kmin
(kmax) is the smallest (largest) degree of the complex
network. From the bird’s eye view, the network attack
can be mapped to the node removal in the corresponding
network graph (all links attached to the removed node
are removed as well), and the network is said to be con-
nected in percolation sense if the giant component (the
connected component that includes a majority of nodes)
still exists after node removal, which we refer to as the
percolation-based connectivity. The physical interpreta-
tion of the percolation-based connectivity is that owing
to the network resilience protocols [9], the network can
continue its main operations under temporal node dis-
function as long as most of the nodes are still connected.
According to the seminal work in [28], given the degree
distribution P (k) of an arbitrary network, a giant com-
ponent containing the majority of the nodes exists in the
network if P (k) satisfies the criterion
∑
k k(k−2)P (k) >
0, which is equivalent to the condition
τ ,
E[K2]
E[K]
> 2, (1)
whereK ∈ [kmin, kmax] is the random variable represent-
ing the degree of a randomly selected node. With the aid
of percolation theory, the critical phenomenon of network
disruption occurs if more than qc fraction of nodes are re-
moved from the network, where the critical value qc can
be estimated when the remaining degree distribution sat-
isfies the criterion τc = 2. In other words, the complex
network transitions from the connected phase to the dis-
connected phase in percolation sense once more than qc
fraction of nodes are removed. Throughout this paper,
the critical value qc is used to evaluate the network ro-
bustness under different network structures and attack
schemes. Please note that in the case of small-scale net-
works, the critical value can be obtained by perform-
ing exhaustive node removal experiments (i.e., searching
over all possible node removal strategies) instead of using
statistic physics approaches (i.e., estimating qc by degree
distribution).
B. Canonical Complex Network Models
In this paragraph, we introduce three canonical com-
plex network models that serve as the platforms for per-
formance evaluation of the proposed defense mechanism.
• ER network. In an ER network [26], a link be-
tween any arbitrarily selected node pair is present
with probability pER. If the network size is large
enough, the degree distribution approaches to the
Poisson distribution P (k) = e−k̂ k̂
k
k! , where k̂ =
N · pER is the mean degree of the network and N
is the number of nodes in the network.
• Power-law network. A power-law network pos-
sesses a skewed degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−α,
where α > 0 is the skewness parameter. The heavy
tail of the degree distribution suggests the existence
of the hub nodes that few nodes have relatively high
degree compared with most of the nodes in the net-
work, which well explains the connectivity of the
WWW [16] or the Internet router maps [17].
• Exponential network. An exponential network
has its degree distribution P (k) ∼ 1
β
e−
k
β , where
β > 0 is the mean degree of the network in the large
scale network limit. It is demonstrated in [29] that
the degree distribution of the power grid can be
characterized by the exponential distribution, both
in the national power grid scale and the European
power grid scale.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model and Sequential Defense
Mechanism
Without loss of generality, we consider the complex
network model consisting of N nodes characterized by
its degree distribution P (k) and the corresponding crit-
ical value qc to sustain network connectivity against at-
tacks. Each node is equipped with certain detection ca-
pability, for instance, intrusion detection techniques [30]
or malicious activity filtering [31] for attack inference.
The N nodes are sorted in descending degree order, i.e.,
k1 ≥ k2,≥ . . . ≥ kN . Let H1 denote the hypothesis that
the attack occurs in the complex network (either on one
node or several nodes simultaneously), and H0 denote
the alternative hypothesis of a null attack (i.e., there is
no attack in the network). Based on the nodal detec-
tion, every node sequentially reports its binary hypothe-
sis testing decision to the data fusion center in descending
degree order since intuitively the removal of nodes with
higher degree results in more severe damage to the net-
work robustness.
It is worth mentioning that although enabling local
information exchange or cooperative detection among
nodes may enhance the attack inference precision, these
approaches inevitably increase the computation and data
transmission overheads. Throughout this paper, we will
concentrate on the degree-based sequential defense mech-
anism owing to its feasibility and simplicity. In practice,
these local decisions can be transmitted in the header of
data packets, or a node is regarded as being attacked if it
fails to reply to the periodic beaconing from the data fu-
sion center. If the attack is confirmed by the data fusion
center, network defense schemes such as node quaran-
tine or system renewal will be launched to alleviate the
damage, otherwise it keeps surveillance on the collected
information.
The advantages of reporting binary attack status for
sequential defense in complex networks reside in the fea-
sibility of data transmission and computation complex-
ity in the large-scale networked systems. The enormous
network size (e.g., Internet routers or wireless sensors)
render simultaneous data transmissions infeasible, espe-
cially for wireless networks with scarce radio resources.
Moreover, owing to the large network size and limited
computational power, analyzing the collected informa-
tion from all nodes incurs tremendous computation over-
heads and it may fail to provide timely defense. Conse-
quently, sequential hypothesis test with minimum (one-
bit) feedback information is an essential must for attack
inference in complex networks because of its least addi-
tional communication overheads and timely defense. In
other words, the sequential hypothesis test terminates
once sufficient information is collected and a final deci-
sion is made by the data fusion center so that the system
can spare the transmissions of the unreported nodes.
Let xi denote the attack status reported by the ith
node. xi = 1 when the attack on the ith node is detected
and xi = 0 for null attack on the ith node. We assume
that the detection capability of each node is identical
with probability of detecting an attack PD and probabil-
ity of false alarm PF . Each node performs independent
hypothesis test such that the joint probability distribu-
tion of the first m ≤ N reports when Hj is true can be
represented as P (x1, . . . , xm|Hj) =
∏m
i=1 P (xi|Hj). In
general, we assume PD ≥ PF , otherwise the sequential
hypothesis test should be altered for attack inference.
B. Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT)
Using sequential analysis [25], let Pjm =∏m
i=1 P (xi|Hj) denote the probability of obtaining
a report sample (x1, . . . , xm), the sequential hypothesis
test is carried out by performing the probability ratio test
with two specified parameters A and B. After receiving
the report from the mth node, if P1m
P0m
≥ A
(
P1m
P0m
≤ B
)
,
then the data fusion center declares the presence of a
(null) attack, otherwise it keeps surveillance on the next
report for attack inference. Moreover, for purposes of
practical computation, it is much more convenient to
perform sequential probability ratio test by computing
the logarithm of the ratio P1m
P0m
instead of the ratio itself
as the product of individual tests can be decomposed
into sum of the log likelihood ratios.
Let zi = log
P (xi|H1)
P (xi|H0)
denote the log likelihood ratio of
the ith report and Λm =
∑m
i=1 zi =
∑m
i=1 log
P (xi|H1)
P (xi|H0)
denote the cumulative value of the first m reports for
hypothesis testing. Consequently, the sequential hy-
pothesis test is terminated with hypothesis H1 (H0) if
Λm ≥ logA (Λm ≤ logB), otherwise the process is con-
tinued by taking an additional report. These two param-
eters A and B can be determined by setting A = 1−θ
δ
and B = θ1−δ , where δ = P (say H1 when H0 is true)
and θ = P (say H0 when H1 is true) are the required
false alarm and miss detection probabilities at the sys-
tem level.
V. CRITICAL VALUES UNDER RANDOM AND
INTENTIONAL ATTACKS
Incorporating the topological vulnerabilities of the
complex network, the critical value qc to sustain
percolation-based connectivity under random and in-
tentional attacks are analyzed with respect to distinct
canonical complex network models. For comprehensive
analysis and clear reading, only the results are displayed
in this section and the mathematical derivations are
placed in the appendices.
A. Random Attack
Random attack on the q fraction of nodes in the net-
work plays an identical role of random node removal.
Given the original network degree K0 of a randomly se-
lected node, the critical value for random attack becomes
qranc = 1−
1
τ0 − 1 , (2)
where τ0 ,
E[K0
2]
E[K0]
is calculated from the original
degree distribution. For ER network, qran−ERc =
1 − 1
k̂
. For power-law network, qran−POWc = 1 −(
2−α
3−α
k
3−α
1
−k3−α
N
k
2−α
1
−k2−α
N
− 1
)−1
. For exponential network,
qran−EXPc = 1−
(
k2N+2kNβ+2β
2
kN+β
− 1
)−1
. Detailed deriva-
tions can be found in Appendix A.
B. Intentional Attack
As demonstrated in [21], removing q fraction of nodes
with the highest degree in the network is equivalent to
randomly removing q˜ fraction of nodes in the remain-
ing network with new cutoff degree k˜max < kmax. With
the continuous degree approximation and the relation∑∞
kmax
P (k) =
∫∞
kmax
P (k)dk = 1
N
, the new cutoff degree
k˜max can be evaluated from
∫ kmax
k=k˜max
P (k)dk =
∫ ∞
k=k˜max
P (k)dk − 1
N
= q. (3)
Moreover, q˜ can be interpreted as the link deletion prob-
ability of a randomly selected link leading to a deleted
node, which equals the ratio of the number of links be-
longing to the deleted nodes to the number of links
[21, 32], i.e., q˜ =
∑kmax
k=k˜max
kP (k)
E[K0]
. By specifying the
relations between link deletion probability and targeted
node removal in (3), the critical value qc under inten-
tional attack can be obtained by evaluating the critical
link deletion probability q˜c with the ubiquitous criterion
for percolation-based connectivity in (2).
For ER network, qint−ERc =
1
N
−e−k̂ k̂k˜max−1
(k˜max−1)!
+1− 1
k̂
.
For power-law network, qint−POWc =
(
k˜max
kN
)1−α
. For
exponential network, the critical value can be obtained
by solving[
1− ln
(
qint−EXPc +
1
N
)](
qint−EXPc +
1
N
)
+
kN + β
k2N + 2kNβ + 2β
2 − kN − β − 1 = 0. (4)
Detailed derivations can be found in Appendix B.
C. Unified Notations for Attack Schemes and
SPRT
Since each node sequentially reports its one-bit detec-
tion result to the data fusion center for attack inference,
let ai denote the probability of attacking ith node, we
introduce the unified notations for the aforementioned
attack schemes as
P (xi|Hj) =
{
B(ai · PD), if j = 1,
B(PF ), if j = 0,
(5)
where B(p) is the Bernoulli trial with probability of suc-
cess (xi = 1) equals p. Incorporating the attack schemes,
we have
arani = q
ran, ∀ i; (6)
ainti = 1i≤⌈Nqint⌉ +
PF
PD
1i>⌈Nqint⌉
= (1− PF
PD
)1i≤⌈Nqint⌉ +
PF
PD
, (7)
where 1E denotes the indicator function of the event E
and ⌈x⌉ is the smallest integer that exceeds x.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF
SEQUENTIAL DEFENSE IN COMPLEX
NETWORKS
Given the specified system parameters (δ, θ), we are in-
terested in the effectiveness and the performance of the
proposed sequential defense mechanism against random
and intentional attacks in complex networks. Further-
more, knowing the critical value qc, the data fusion cen-
ter is required to infer the presence of the attack prior
to the network disruption. In other words, a final deci-
sion has to be made according to the first Mc = ⌈N · qc⌉
reports for practical implementation purposes, which we
refer to as the worst case scenario. Upon the reception of
the Mcth report, if a final decision has not been reached,
the data fusion center declares the presence of attack
when 0 < ΛMc < logA and declares a null attack when
logB < ΛMc ≤ 0.
Let Mj denote the expected number of reports re-
quired for hypothesis testing when Hj is true. The pro-
posed sequential defense mechanism is regarded as effec-
tive against attacks in the complex network if M1 ≤Mc,
i.e., the number of reports required for attack inference
is less than the threshold of network disruption, other-
wise the defense is in vain since it fails to provide timely
defense reaction. We derive the closed-form expressions
of M1 for random and intentional attacks, and we prove
that for intentional attack, taking additional reports from
m > Mc nodes does not improve the performance of the
sequential defense mechanism.
A. Random Attack
For random attack, with (5) we have
P1m =
m∏
i=1
P (xi|H1)
= (qranPD)
dm(1− qranPD)m−dm ; (8)
P0m =
m∏
i=1
P (xi|H0)
= (PF )
dm(1− PF )m−dm , (9)
where dm is the number of ones in the first m reports.
Simple calculation on Λm yields
Λm = dm log
qranPD
PF
+ (m− dm) log 1− q
ranPD
1− PF . (10)
Following the process of SPRT in Sec. IVB, the sequen-
tial defense criterion for random attack becomes
say H1, if dm ≥ logA
log
qranPD
PF
−log
1−qranPD
1−PF
+m
log
1−PF
1−qranPD
log
qranPD
PF
−log
1−qranPD
1−PF
,
say H0, if dm ≤ logB
log
qranPD
PF
−log
1−qranPD
1−PF
+m
log
1−PF
1−qranPD
log
qranPD
PF
−log
1−qranPD
1−PF
,
keep surveillance, otherwise.
The expected number of reports to identify random at-
tack when H1 is true is
M ran1 =
θ logB + (1− θ) logA
E[zi|H1]
=
θ log θ1−δ + (1 − θ) log 1−θδ
qranPD log
qranPD
PF
+ (1 − qranPD) log 1−qranPD1−PF
.
(11)
For the worst case scenario, if m is large enough, from
central limit theorem we obtain the lower bounds of the
probability that the SPRT will terminate by declaring
attack or null attack with m ≤Mc reports as [25]
P (declare attack) = P (Λm ≥ logA) ≥ 1− Φ(y1(Mc));
(12)
P (declare null attack) = P (Λm ≤ logB) ≥ Φ(y2(Mc)),
(13)
where Φ(x) is the cumulative density function (CDF) of
a standard normal distribution, and
y1(Mc) =
logA−McE[zi|H1]√
Mcσ(zi|H1)
; (14)
y2(Mc) =
logB −McE[zi|H0]√
Mcσ(zi|H0)
; (15)
E[zi|H0] = PF log q
ranPD
PF
+ (1 − PF ) log 1− q
ranPD
1− PF ;
(16)
σ(zi|H1) =
√
qranPD(1− qranPD) log q
ranPD(1− PF )
PF (1− qranPD) ;
(17)
σ(zi|H0) =
√
PF (1− PF ) log q
ranPD(1− PF )
PF (1− qranPD) , (18)
where σ(zi|H1) and σ(zi|H0) are the standard deviation
of zi under H1 and H0, respectively. Moreover, when
a final decision needs to be made upon the reception of
Mcth report, the system level false alarm and miss de-
tection probabilities (δ, θ) when taking Mc reports are
bounded by [25]
δ(Mc) ≤ δ +Φ(y3(Mc))− Φ(y4(Mc)); (19)
θ(Mc) ≤ θ +Φ(y5(Mc))− Φ(y6(Mc)), (20)
where
y3(Mc) =
logA−McE[zi|H0]√
Mcσ(zi|H0)
; (21)
y4(Mc) = −
√
Mc
E[zi|H0]
σ(zi|H0) ; (22)
y5(Mc) = −
√
Mc
E[zi|H1]
σ(zi|H1) ; (23)
y6(Mc) =
logB −McE[zi|H1]√
Mcσ(zi|H1)
. (24)
The aforementioned equations are well-known results
from [25] applied by the specified parameters qran, PF ,
PD and Mc. Interested readers are referred to [25] for
more details.
B. Intentional Attack
Let dm denote the number of nodes reporting attack
for the first M = ⌈Nqint⌉ reports and dm′ denote the
number of nodes reporting attack starting from the m′th
node (m′ > M). With (6), we obtain
P1m = P
dm
D
[
(1 − PD)m−dm1m≤M + (1− PD)M−dm1m>M
]
·
[
1m≤M + P
dm′
F (1− PF )m−M−dm′1m>M
]
= P dmD
[
(1 − PD)m−dm1m≤M + (1− PD)M−dm
· P dm′F (1− PF )m−M−dm′1m>M
]
, (25)
P0m = P
dm
F
[
(1 − PF )m−dm1m≤M + (1− PF )M−dm
· P dm′F (1− PF )m−M−dm′1m>M
]
. (26)
The cumulative log likelihood ratio becomes
Λm = dm log
PD
PF
+
[
(m− dm) log 1− PD
1− PF
]
1m≤M
+
[
(M − dm) log 1− PD
1− PF + dm
′ log
PF
PF
+ (m−M − dm′) log 1− PF
1− PF
]
1m>M
= dm log
PD
PF
+
[
(m− dm) log 1− PD
1− PF
]
1m≤M
+ (M − dm)
[
log
1− PD
1− PF
]
1m>M
= dm
(
log
PD
PF
− log 1− PD
1− PF
)
+ (m1m≤M +M1m>M ) log
1− PD
1− PF , (27)
which suggests that taking additional reports starting
from the m′th node does not help to improve the perfor-
mance of the sequential defense mechanism as intuitively
intentional attack targets only on the firstM nodes. The
sequential defense criterion for intentional attack is

say H1, if dm ≥ logA
log
PD
PF
−log
1−PD
1−PF
+ (m1m≤M +M1m>M )
log
1−PF
1−PD
log
PD
PF
−log
1−PD
1−PF
,
say H0, if dm ≤ logB
log
PD
PF
−log
1−PD
1−PF
+ (m1m≤M +M1m>M )
log
1−PF
1−PD
log
PD
PF
−log
1−PD
1−PF
,
keep surveillance, otherwise.
The expected number of reports required to identify in-
tentional attack when H1 is true is
M int1 =
θ log θ1−δ + (1 − θ) log 1−θδ
PD log
PD
PF
+ (1 − PD) log 1−PD1−PF
. (28)
Consequently, the sequential defense mechanism loses
its appeals if M1 > Mc since the reports received are
insufficient for attack inference before the adversary dis-
rupts the entire network as proved in (27). Moreover, it
is easy to show that the performance of worst case sce-
nario (M =Mc) for intentional attack is identical to that
of random attack by substituting Mc = ⌈Nqintc ⌉ and ainti
into (12), (13), (19) and (20).
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FIG. 2. Vulnerabilities of different canonical complex network
models under random and intentional attacks. Intentional at-
tack is much more effective in disintegrating a complex net-
work compared with random attack. Although power-law net-
works are resilient to random attack, they are very vulnerable
to intentional attack due to the existence of hub nodes with
relatively high degree.
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FIG. 3. Number of reports required for attack detection
(Mran1 ) with respect to q
ran under random attack. Mran1
is shown to be a decreasing function of PD due to better
precision in attack inference. Mran1 increases with PF to dis-
tinguish between attack and null attack.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the proposed sequential defense mech-
anism is employed on canonical complex network models
as well as empirical network data to evaluate the system
performance and offer new insights on robust network
design. The system parameters are set to be N = 10000,
k1 = 1000, kN = 1, δ = 0.01 and θ = 0.001 without
additional specifications.
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FIG. 4. Number of reports required for attack detection
(M int1 ) with respect to PD under intentional attack. Com-
pared with random attack, the proposed sequential defense
mechanism requires only a few number of reports to target in-
tentional attack, even in the low detection probability regime.
FIG. 5. Performance of sequential defense against random
attack in ER networks with PF = 0.001.
A. Critical Values of Canonical Complex Network
Models
For fair comparisons between different canonical com-
plex network models, we set the original mean degree to
be identical such that k̂ = c1 · k
2−α
1
−k2−α
N
2−α = kN+β and ac-
cordingly extract the network parameters k̂, α and β for
ER, power-law and exponential networks. As shown in
Fig. 2, the critical value qc approaches to 0 as the mean
degree decreases to 1 for all canonical complex network
models since intuitively a network is prone to disruption
if every node has only one link in average. On the other
hand, the critical value increases with the mean degree
as every node is able to connect to more nodes in the
network in order to strengthen the network connectiv-
ity. Compared with random attack, intentional attack is
shown to be more effective in disintegrating a network
by sabotaging a small fraction of nodes with the high-
FIG. 6. Performance of sequential defense against random
attack in power-law networks with PF = 0.001.
FIG. 7. Performance of sequential defense against random
attack in exponential networks with PF = 0.001.
est degree. Moreover, despite the fact that the power-
law network is resilient to random attack, the inherently
skewed degree distribution render it quite vulnerable to
intentional attack due to the existence of hub nodes with
relatively high degree, which reveal the bottleneck of net-
work robustness against intelligent attacks.
B. Performance of Sequential Defense Mechanism
By employing the proposed sequential defense mecha-
nism in the complex networks, we select the number of
reports required to identify an attack (M1) as the per-
formance measure for timely and efficient defense. As
shown in Fig. 3, M ran1 is shown to be a decreasing func-
tion of PD because of better precision in attack inference,
and M ran1 increases with PF in order to distinguish at-
tack and null attack. In addition, since M ran1 is also
a decreasing function of qran, the optimal attack strat-
egy for an intelligent adversary to disrupt the complex
network would be choosing qran = qranc in order to dis-
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FIG. 8. Probability of acceptance and rejection under worst
case scenario with PF = 0.001. The probability of acceptance
can be interpreted as the precision for attack inference, and
the probability of rejection can be interpreted as the proba-
bility for an adversary to disrupt a network.
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FIG. 9. System level false alarm probability under worst case
scenario with PF = 0.001 and δ = 0.01.
rupt the network while minimizing the risks of being de-
tected. The performance of sequential defense mecha-
nism against intentional attack is shown in Fig. 4. Simi-
lar to random attack, M int1 increases with PF to validate
the presence of attack. Compared with random attack,
the proposed sequential defense mechanism requires only
a few number of reports to target intentional attack, even
in the low detection probability regime.
To gain clear insights on the performance of the pro-
posed sequential defense mechanism, we plot M ran1 and
its contours with respect to the network parameters and
PD for ER, power-law and exponential networks in Fig.
5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, respectively. The network parame-
ters are associated with the critical values under random
attack as discussed in Sec. V. For ER and exponential
networks, M ran1 increases with the decrease of k̂ (β) and
PD as the mean degree is proportional to k̂ (β) and low
PD hinders the process of SPRT. For power-law networks,
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FIG. 10. System level miss detection probability under worst
case scenario with PF = 0.001 and θ = 0.001.
more skewed degree distribution (larger α) incurs larger
M ran1 since the network is prone to disruption as α in-
creases [20].
C. Reliability of Sequential Defense Mechanism
To validate the reliability of the proposed sequential
defense mechanism, the performance of worst case sce-
nario is investigated with respect to the critical values to
sustain network connectivity. In view of practical imple-
mentations, an attack decision has to be made upon the
reception of Mc = ⌈N · qc⌉ reports. The probability of
acceptance (declaring attack) and the probability of re-
jection (declaring null attack) are displayed in Fig. 8. It
is observed that the proposed sequential defense mech-
anism achieves high accuracy as the probability of ac-
ceptance (probability of rejection) approaches to 1 (0) at
extremely small critical values, and higher PD enhances
the accuracy for attack inference, which validate that the
proposed sequential defense mechanism is able to identify
the attack with high precision. More importantly, given a
critical value of a complex network, the probability of ac-
ceptance can be interpreted as the precision of identifying
an attack prior to the network disruption, and the proba-
bility of rejection can be interpreted as the probability for
an adversary to disrupt a complex network. The system
level parameters (δ(qc), θ(qc)) of the worst case scenario
are demonstrated in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, respectively.
These parameters converge to the desired system level
parameters (δ, θ) at extremely small critical values, sug-
gesting that the proposed sequential defense mechanism
offers reliable and effective approaches against random
and intentional attacks in complex networks.
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FIG. 11. Performance of sequential defense mechanism un-
der random attack with empirical network data. The crit-
ical values are (qranc ,Mc) = (0.9909, 322780), (q
ran
c ,Mc) =
(0.9673, 6000) and (qranc ,Mc) = (0.629, 764) for the WWW,
Internet and EU power grid, respectively.
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FIG. 12. Performance of sequential defense mechanism under
intentional attack with empirical network data. The critical
values are (qintc ,Mc) = (0.067, 21824), (q
int
c ,Mc) = (0.03, 187)
and (qintc ,Mc) = (0.275, 766) for the WWW, Internet and EU
power grid, respectively.
D. Empirical Network Data
As a demonstration, the proposed sequential defense
mechanism are implemented in real-world large-scale net-
works with network parameters extracted from empiri-
cal network data collected in [7, 29]. The WWW con-
tains 325729 nodes (webpages) and 1798353 links with
E[K0] = 4.6. The Internet router-level map contains
6209 nodes (routers) and 12200 links with E[K0] = 3.4.
The EU power grid contains 2783 nodes (power stations)
and 3762 links with E[K0] = 3.4. The WWW and the
Internet are power-law networks with network parame-
ters α = 2.1 and α = 2.5, respectively. The EU power
grid is an exponential network with network parameter
β = 1.63. As shown in Fig. 11, the number of reports
required to identify random attack (M ran1 ) is lower than
the threshold Mc, even in the case of weak detection ca-
pability (low PD). On the other hand, M
ran
1 increases
with PF as the data fusion center requires more reports to
distinguish between attack and null attack when the false
alarm probability increases. Fig. 12 displays the perfor-
mance of the sequential defense mechanism with respect
to PD and PF under intentional attack. A surge increase
of M int1 is observed with the decrease of PD and the in-
crease of PF , suggesting that the defense configurations
have to be adjusted according to network characteristics
in order to guarantee robust and reliable operations of
the entire system, especially for the networks which are
particularly vulnerable to intentional attack.
E. US Power Grid
We implement the proposed sequential defense mecha-
nism on the US power grid topology collected in [27]. In
addition to degree and random attacks, we also consider
betweenness attack, where betweenness of a node is de-
fined as the fraction of all shortest paths passing through
the node among all shortest paths between each node pair
in the network [33]. As shown in Fig. 13, the network
resilience is evaluated in terms of the largest component
size when a subset of nodes is removed from the network.
Given the expected number of reports required for attack
detectionM1, if an adversary attacks less thanM1 nodes
in the network, then the attack will not be detected,
which we refer to as the undetectable region. As shown
in Fig. 13, M1 decreases as PD increases, and it is shown
to be relatively small compared with the network size.
Notably, in the undetectable region, most of the nodes
are still connected, even with small PD. The results in-
dicate that the proposed sequential defense mechanism is
quite effective in attack detection and the network suffers
slight connectivity loss in the undetectable region. Note
that the perfect protection defense strategy proposed in
[22] is a degenerate case of our proposed mechanism when
PD → 1 and PF → 0. It results in extremely small M1
and suggests that a network can be robust to attacks if
perfect protection is plausible.
VIII. DISCUSSIONS TOWARD ROBUST
NETWORK DESIGN
Based on the performance analysis of a complex net-
work empowered with the proposed sequential defense
mechanism, we provide some insights on robust network
design against attacks in complex networks. To guar-
antee that the process of SPRT terminates before an
adversary paralyzes the entire system, the baseline re-
quirement for the network disruption threshold is Mc ≥
max
{
M ran1 ,M
int
1
}
, which ensures that the data fusion
center can acquire sufficient information for attack infer-
ence and make immediate reactions against the attacks
prior to the network disruption. In other words, in the
network operator’s point of view, one has to enhance the
critical values of a network under attacks to maintain
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FIG. 13. Performance of sequential defense mechanism on US
power grid topology [27] under different attack schemes with
PF = 0.005. The power grid topology contains 4941 nodes
(power stations) and 6594 edges (power lines). For random
attack, the results are averaged over 100 realizations. The
expected number of reports (M1) needed for attack detec-
tion is relatively small and it decreases as PD increases. The
proposed sequential defense mechanism is quite effective in
the sense the network suffers slight connectivity loss when
the number of attacked nodes is less than M1 (i.e., the unde-
tectable region), even for small PD.
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to guarantee network robustness.
the operations of the defense mechanism in the system,
which can be achieved via different approaches in con-
sideration of the network configurations and implemen-
tation costs. Consequently, this paper offers analytically
tractable tools for robust network design and network
defense performance assessment. Potential approaches
to network robustness enhancement are discussed as fol-
lows.
• Link Addition. As shown in Fig. 2, adding
more links in the network (i.e., increasing the mean
degree) strengthens the network connectivity and
thereby offers more protection against attacks. Al-
though link addition is a straightforward solution
[34, 35], the major drawback of link addition is that
it may decrease the system revenue if the costs for
link constructions are high, such as the transporta-
tion systems.
• Topology Adjustment. As the network re-
silience varies from network parameters, the crit-
ical value of a network can be modified by topol-
ogy adjustment while keeping the number of links
in the network (i.e., the mean degree) unchanged
[36], which is especially suitable for networks con-
nected by logical configurations (e.g., the WWW).
For an example, as demonstrated in Fig. 2, adjust-
ing a power-law network to an exponential network
enhances the resilience against intentional attack
at the cost of decreasing the resilience against ran-
dom attack, which offers tradeoffs between M ran1
and M int1 .
• Detection Capability Enhancement. In cases
that link addition and topology adjustment are in-
feasible and thereby the critical values can not be
modified, one has to enhance the detection capabil-
ity to provide reliable network defense against at-
tacks. Take sequential defense against intentional
attack as a motivating example, the sequential de-
fense mechanism is able to target intentional attack
if the network disruption threshold Mc is no less
than M int1 . Applying this criterion to (28), the fea-
sible parameters PD and PF for sequential defense
mechanism need to satisfy the inequality
PD log
PD
PF
+ (1− PD) log 1− PD
1− PF
≥ θ log
θ
1−δ + (1− θ) log 1−θδ
Mc
. (29)
The operation curves when the equality in (29)
holds given a specified network disruption thresh-
old (Mc) are shown in Fig. 14, which can be inter-
preted as the minimum detection probability (PD)
required to perform sequential defense with respect
to a false alarm probability PF and Mc. The feasi-
ble operation region is composed of the parameters
(PD,PF ) satisfying the inequality in (29), and the
increase of Mc enlarges the feasible operation re-
gion since the data fusion center can acquire more
reports for attack inference prior to network dis-
ruption, even in the low PD regime.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a sequential defense mechanism based
on sequential hypothesis test is proposed in complex net-
works with an aim of enhancing the network robustness
of networked engineering systems. This mechanism pro-
vides timely and efficient defense against random and
intentional attacks by sequentially acquiring binary at-
tack status of each node in descending degree order. The
data collection process terminates once a final decision
has been made by the data fusion center, which is partic-
ularly preferable in networking paradigms with stringent
data transmission resources. Therefore the low compu-
tation complexity and sequential transmission schemes
render this defense mechanism compatible to practical
networked engineering systems. A parametric plug-in
model is proposed to evaluate the performance of the
proposed sequential defense mechanism. By implement-
ing this mechanism on the canonical complex network
models as well as the empirical network data extracted
from the WWW, the Internet, the EU power grid, and
the US power grid topology, the results validate the ef-
fectiveness and reliability of this mechanism against fatal
attacks. These attacks can be identified with high pre-
cision with limited binary attack status reported from
a small subset of nodes in the network and thereby im-
mediate defense reactions can be performed prior to the
network disruption, even in the weak topological vulner-
ability and low detection capability regime. Based on the
performance analysis and network configurations, several
approaches including link addition, topology adjustment
and detection capability enhancement are elucidated to
guarantee robust operations of the entire system. Con-
sequently, this paper provides profound theoretic frame-
work of sequential defense in complex networks and of-
fers new insights on robust network design in complex
networks.
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Appendix A: Critical Value for Random Attack
Following [20], given the original degree distribution
P0(k0), the new degree distribution of the network after
randomly removing q fraction of nodes (the links ema-
nating from the nodes are removed as well) is
P (k) =
kmax∑
k0=k
P0(k0)
(
k0
k
)
(1− q)kqk0−k. (A1)
Applying (A1) to (1), the criterion for the percolation-
based connectivity after random attack becomes
(1− q)2E[K02] + q(1 − q)E[K0]
(1− q)E[K0] = 2. (A2)
Reorganizing (A2), we obtain the critical value qranc =
1 − 1
τ0−1
as in (2). For ER network, we have E[K0] = k̂
and E[K0
2] = k̂2 + k̂, applying to (2), we have
qran−ERc = 1−
1
k̂
. (A3)
For power-law network, the rth moment of the degree
distribution is E[Kr] = c1 · k
r−α+1
max −k
r−α+1
min
r−α+1 , where c1 =
1−α
k
1−α
max−k
1−α
min
is the normalization factor. Applying to (2),
we obtain
qran−POWc = 1−
1
2−α
3−α
k3−α
1
−k3−α
N
k
2−α
1
−k2−α
N
− 1
. (A4)
For exponential network, P (k) = c2 · 1β e−
k
β , where c2 =
1
e
−
kN
β −e
−
k1
β
is the normalization factor. In the large scale
network limit (i.e., k1 → ∞), c2 = e
kN
β , E[K] = kN + β
and E[K2] = k2N + 2kNβ + 2β
2. We obtain
qran−EXPc = 1−
1
k2
N
+2kNβ+2β2
kN+β
− 1
. (A5)
Appendix B: Critical Value for Intentional Attack
For simplicity, we derive the critical value under inten-
tional attack in the large scale network limit (k1 → ∞)
as follows. It is also suggested in [21] the large scale
network limit assumption has negligible impacts on the
accuracy of the critical value provided that the network
size (N) is large enough. The methodology for deriving
the critical value under intentional attack is to specify the
relations between the cutoff degree d˜max and the fraction
of removed nodes q using (3), and then apply the cutoff
degree to the deletion probability q˜ and the criterion for
percolation-based connectivity in (2) to obtain the criti-
cal value qintc .
For ER network, from (3) we have e−k̂ k̂
k1
k1!
= 1
N
and
q =
∑k1
k=k˜max
e−k̂ k̂
k
k! = 1 − Γ(k˜max,k̂)(k˜max−1)! , where Γ(s, x) =∫∞
x
ts−1e−tdt is the upper incomplete gamma function.
The deletion probability becomes q˜ =
∑k1
k=k˜max
kP (k)
E[K0]
=∑k1
k=k˜max
e−k̂ k̂
k−1
(k−1)! = q− 1N +e−k̂ k̂
k˜max−1
(k˜max−1)!
, and the cut-
off degree k˜max can be obtained by solving q˜ = 1 − 1
k̂
.
Consequently, the critical value under intentional attack
is
qint−ERc =
1
N
− e−k̂ k̂
k˜max−1(
k˜max − 1
)
!
+ 1− 1
k̂
. (B1)
For power-law network, from (3) we have k˜max =
kN
(
q + 1
N
) 1
1−α and q
N→∞
=
(
k˜max
kN
)1−α
for all α > 1.
The relations between q˜ and q are q˜ =
∫ k1
k=k˜max
kP (k)
E[K0]
dk =(
k˜max
kN
)2−α
= q
2−α
1−α . The cutoff degree k˜man can be
solved by applying the link deletion probability to the
criterion in (2), which yields the equation
(
k˜max
kN
)2−α
−
kN
(
2−α
3−α
) [(
k˜max
kN
)3−α
− 1
]
−2 = 0 [21], and we thereby
obtain
qint−POWc =
(
k˜max
kN
)1−α
. (B2)
For exponential network, the relations between the
cutoff degree and the fraction of removed nodes are
k˜max = −β ln
(
q + 1
N
)
+ kN . The deletion prob-
ability becomes q˜ =
∫ k1
k=k˜max
kP (k)
E[K0]
dk =
exp
(
kN
β
)
kN+β
·(
k˜max + β
)
exp
(
− k˜max
β
)
. If kN is negligible (i.e., kN =
0), we have q˜ =
[
1− ln (q + 1
N
)] (
q + 1
N
)
. Applying the
result to (A5), the critical value under intentional attack
can be obtained by solving[
1− ln
(
qint−EXPc +
1
N
)](
qint−EXPc +
1
N
)
+
kN + β
k2N + 2kNβ + 2β
2 − kN − β − 1 = 0. (B3)
